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The Hague programme (Internal Security and Justice in the period 2005-2009): 
the Polish perspective 
 
 
A tragedy of a few hundreds of European victims of terrorism, especially those who 
fell 11 March 2004 in Madrid as well as those in Istanbul and African resorts, might 
have a crucial impact on creating a coherent and effective European security system. 
The attacks in Madrid in particular stimulated a lively discussion about the European 
justice and home affairs policy (JHA), co-operation or even integration of police and 
intelligence services1. Internal security became one of the priorities of the 
Netherlands’ Presidency. 
 
Therefore, it seemed quite natural that the then counter-terrorism context affected the 
last phase of evaluation of the former programme introducing JHA policy (the 
Tampere I programme) and the development of the new one – the Hague 
programme (called also Tampere II). The Tampere I programme was thought to 
create the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Poland’s participation in 
the programme was limited for the formal reason (no membership) and proceeded 
only in a conforming, passive way. Besides, Poland was not included within as 
essential part of (AFSJ) as Schengen, due to weak preparation on its side and delays 
on the Union’s side. 
 
 
Over-ambitious goals of the Tampere programme 
 
It has to be admitted, that the Tampere programme – with not all the original aims 
achieved2 – actually consisted of two phases, the first one rather passive and 
sluggish (before September 2001) and the second one more active (after Al-Kaida 
attacks in September 2001 and Madrid attacks in March 2004). The Tampere agenda 
was very ambitious, probably too ambitious, as it had not been completed despite 
                                            
1 For more information on this issue, see: Antoni Podolski – “Bezpieczeństwo europejskie po Madrycie 
z polskiej perspektywy” [The European security after Madrid events: the Polish perspective], CSM 
2004. 
2 Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament – “Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations”, 
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favorable political environment, notably since the late 2001. The favorable conditions 
already existed earlier and were generated by the old EU countries’ public fears of 
the increasing crime threat (due to the enlargement3) and a rising influx of immigrants 
from Asia and Africa. However, the credit for the European integration in terms of 
internal security and justice goes to Islamic terrorists. Their attacks in the U.S. in 
September 2001 and in Madrid in March 2004 had a great impact on accelerating the 
execution of the Tampere and other security initiatives.  
 
The first two years of the Tampere programme execution (until the late 2001) can be 
described as a rather theoretical implementation, but a clear legislative and 
organizational acceleration could be noted right after 11 September 2001. In 2001-
2004, the European framework for combating organized crime and terrorism was 
established (European Arrest Warrant4, the European list of terrorist groups, the 
European terrorism definition5, setting up joint investigation teams6, establishing 
Eurojust, a European prosecution agency, implementing specific measures for police 
and judicial cooperation7, establishing the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders8, including special services within 
the current cooperation of police forces9, combating money laundering10, execution of 
orders of freezing property or evidence11). However, none of the Framework 
Decisions had been adopted in each member state before the attacks in Madrid in 
March 200412. 
                                                                                                                                        
Brussels, 2.6.2004. 
3 More on that: Joerg Monar – “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice After the 11th September: 
Problems of Balance and Challenge of Power”; EU 2002 Organized Crime Report. 
4 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 relative on the European Arrest Warrant and surrender 
procedures between the Member States, JO L 190 of 18.7.2002. 
5 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the fight against terrorism, JO L 164 of 22.6.2002. 
6 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams, JO L 162 of 20.6.2002, p. 
1. 
7 Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against 
serious crime, JO L 63 of 6.3.2002, p. 1; Council Decision of 19 December 2002 on the 
implementation of specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorism in 
accordance with Article 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. 
8 The Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, 11.11.2003. 
9 Council Decision of 28 November 2003 Council Decision of 28 February 2002. 
10 Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, 
freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, JO L 182 of 5.7. 
2001, p. 1. 
11 Council Framework Decision of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union of orders 
freezing property or evidence, JO L 196 of 2.8.2003, p. 45. 
12 Commission Press Room – MEMO04/63 – “Existing legislative instruments relevant to the fight 
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After the Madrid shock, the European Council urged “all Member States to take any 
measures that remain necessary to implement fully and without delay the (...) 
legislative measures.”13 Again, the issue of insufficient exchange of information 
between law enforcement authorities of member states as well as between their 
authorities and the EU bodies (Europol, Eurojust) and their jurisdiction was 
discussed14. The hope arose to create the European-level internal security system, in 
both the legislative and, the more difficult, organizational sphere. 
 
 
Ambitions of the Tampere II programme vs. realism of the Hague programme 
 
The after-Madrid acceleration of integrating security actions found expression in the 
European Commission mid-2004 proposals to be included in the AFSJ action-plan for 
the next five years, at the time referred to as the Tampere II programme. The 
proposals included, among other things, increasing Europol and Eurojust jurisdiction, 
creating legislative frameworks in order to improve information exchange between 
the member states’ services and building a coherent criminal justice policy15. 
According to the Commission’s ambitions, Europol should be transformed into the 
EU’s police16 as well as Eurojust, planned to become a European public prosecutor's 
                                                                                                                                        
against terrorism, and draft measures already on the Council table”. 
13 Short deadlines were even set to eliminate negligence in Europol, Eurojust and Police Chiefs’ Task 
Force performance. The Council also pointed out the delaying progress in implementing the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), setting specific deadlines for the appropriate 
regulations and decisions to come into force (by June 2004) and for deciding over its location, 
management and financing (by May 2004). The Commission is obliged to submit proposals for 
enhanced interoperability between European databases and to explore the creation of synergies 
between existing and future information systems (SIS II, VIS and EURODAC), which clearly shows 
there are still obstacles to encounter in this matter. Apart from delays in bringing the EU’s decisions 
into effect, reluctance to share intelligence and police information related to national sovereignty is 
another weakness of the developed European security system. - The European Council Declaration 
on Combating Terrorism, 25.03.2004; Antonio Vittorino, the European Commissioner for justice and 
home affairs – IP/04/425. 
14 Communication from the European Commission, 30.03.2004 – IP/04/425. 
15 Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament – “Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations”, 
Brussels, 02.06.2004. 
16 "It seems indispensable (...) to give thought to the legal framework of Europol, to make it truly 
operational and convert it into a Union agency, financed from the Community budget." - 
Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament – “Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations”, Brussels, 
02.06.2004, p. 14. 
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office17. Pressing issues raised by the EU enlargement resulted in placing emphasis 
on the strengthening external borders and “the preparation of the new Member 
States for full accession to the Schengen acquis.”18 Prospective removal of all 
internal border checks (i.e. the admission of new members to Schengen), included in 
the draft Commission’s proposal, was seen as introducing “an integrated external 
border management system”, with the long-term objective of establishing a European 
Corps of border guards19. Solutions concerning asylum system and immigration 
policy of member states would be integrated in the similar way20. 
 
It has to be stressed that the final version of the Commission’s proposal (June 2004) 
reflected the after-Madrid pro-integration climate, even with some states suggesting 
establishing a European Intelligence Agency21. However, six months after the Madrid 
attack, with fortunately no more victims of terrorism and a difficult compromise over 
the constitution, the pro-integration enthusiasm decreased substantially, particularly 
with regard to giving more jurisdiction to the existing EU bodies or even setting up 
new ones. National issues got on the rise. Projects of new EU institutions were 
replaced with the ideas of reinforced cooperation between the individual states’ 
institutions and setting up or strengthening various joint investigation teams (e.g. 
Police Chiefs’ Task Force as an alternative to Europol). This tendency could be easily 
observed when a position of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was established within 
the European Council’s framework, with its Secretary-General / High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, instead of extending 
Europol jurisdiction. The Coordinator, Mr. Gijs de Vries, is supported by the 
delegated officers of the national services, acting as the EU's military Situation 
                                            
17 "A European Public Prosecutor’s Office with specific responsibility for offences to the detriment of 
the Union’s financial interests, should be able to be created from Eurojust." - Communication from the 
commission to the council and the European parliament – “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations”, Brussels, 02.06.2004, p. 13. 
18 Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament – “Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations”, 
Brussels, 02.06.2004, p. 7. 
19 "The development of coordination mechanisms must be strengthened and supplemented with the 
long-term objective of establishing a European Corps of border guards to complement the national 
border guards." - Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament – 
“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future 
orientations”, Brussels, 02.06.2004, p. 9. 
20 Communication from the commission to the council and the European parliament – “Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future orientations”, 
Brussels, 02.06.2004, pp. 9-10. 
21 For more information on this issue, see: Antoni Podolski - "Europejska Współpraca Wywiadowcza – 
Center for International Relations© 
 5
Centre (SitCen), whereas, for instance, some smaller member states, including 
Austria and Greece, suggested establishing a new European Intelligence Agency22. 
 
It is therefore no surprise that after a nearly half-a-year discussion, concerning, 
among other things, further development of the AFSJ, instead of the Commission’s 
courageous action-plan, the November European Council enacted the programme, 
referred to as the Hague programme, being clearly less-ambitious or even cautious 
and over-realistic, based on inter-governmental negotiations23. The concept of “inter-
governmental” way of organizing actions and information exchange, as regards the 
EU internal security, has definitely won. There will be no new, independent European 
police or intelligence institutions; only the cooperation and information exchange 
between the member states’ services should develop. The role of the EU institutions 
will limit to facilitating or acting as an agent of the cooperation; they will not be 
entitled to take any independent actions nor stand in for police or judicial institutions 
of the member states. No European Border Guard will be set up as well as no EU’s 
police or judicial agencies will be formed out of the existing Europol or Eurojust. 
Moreover, it is stressed that he control and surveillance of external borders fall within 
the sphere of national border authorities, at least until the end of 2007. Then, the 
Commission will assess the performance of the already established European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders24. 
This assessment should include the viability study of introducing a European Border 
Guard System. Thus, the idea to establish an independent EU’s border guard has 
been abandoned in favor of the system of cooperation between national border 
guards25. Similarly, the role of Europol is to secure information exchange and threat 
analysis for national police services and more operational force will be given to the 
Police Chiefs’ Task Force26. The “inter-governmental” way of cooperation is also 
reflected in a proposal to establish an Internal Security Committee27 within the 
                                                                                                                                        
brakujące ogniwo CFSP?" [European Intelligence Cooperation - a missing cell of CFSP?], CSM, 2004. 
22 For more information on this issue, see: Antoni Podolski - "Europejska Współpraca Wywiadowcza – 
brakujące ogniwo CFSP?" [European Intelligence Cooperation - a missing cell of CFSP?], CSM, 2004. 
23 “The Hague Programme. Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” - 
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 14292/04, Annex I. 
24 “The Hague Programme. Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” - 
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 14292/04, Annex I, p. 17. 
25 Consistent with the Seville European Council Action Plan (14 June 2002). 
26 “The Hague Programme. Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” - 
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 14292/04, Annex I, p. 23. 
27 “The Hague Programme. Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” - 
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European Council as well as to increase the role of the Situation Centre (SitCen), 
acting also within the framework of the European Council and the Secretariat-
General, in the field of threat analysis based on police and intelligence services of the 
member states28. 
 
It seems that, under the current political circumstances of the divided Europe, the 
possible maximum level of integration in terms of internal security and justice 
depends on the will to develop the EU’s legislation in this matter, particularly 
standardizing criminal law and mutual recognition of judicial decisions issued by law 
enforcement authorities (especially, arrest warrants). 
 
 
Poland in between Tampere and Schengen 
 
What was the Polish reaction to those political processes and tendencies, particularly 
to the European Commission’s proposal? Should the definitive shape of the Hague 
programme be seen as Poland’s success or failure? 
 
Before we start discussing Poland’s stance, we should try to describe the general 
circumstances affecting the Polish assessment of both the Tampere programme and 
its continuation. Some limited trust that the Central and Eastern European candidate 
states were exposed to, has already been mentioned. The enlargement was feared 
to increase the threat of organized and minor crime wave, moving from the East 
towards the West across the alleged leaky borders of the new member states and 
their corrupted and inefficient police and judicial systems29. However, it has to be 
reminded that the kind of discipline that characterized the states heading towards the 
EU accession resulted in Poland’s being, for instance, much more advanced than the 
old EU members in terms of implementing the Framework Decisions, including the 
European Arrest Warrant30, the Joint Investigation Teams31 and combating 
                                                                                                                                        
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 14292/04, Annex I, p. 24. 
28 “The Hague Programme. Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” - 
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 14292/04, Annex I, p. 21. 
29 Joerg Monar, op. cit. 
30 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 relative on the European Arrest Warrant and 
surrender procedures between the Member States, JO L 190 of 18.7.2002, implemented within the 
Polish legislative framework by means of Article 2/2 of the Act of 16 April 2004 introducing changes to 
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terrorism32. In other words, our Eastern border security does not seem to be less 
effective than that of the old member states. 
 
However, despite the huge organizational effort, the EU’s cautious approach to the 
new members resulted in postponing their admission to Schengen, under the 
pretence of modernizing the Schengen Information System33. Some formal obstacles 
to accessing classified information were another pretence to limit the new members’ 
access to information34. Under such circumstances, it became clear that the date of 
the Schengen enlargement is linked with the date of establishing the European 
borders management. 
 
 
Poland and the Hague programme 
 
The Polish stance could be therefore expected to support the items on the Hague 
agenda that would bring the Schengen enlargement nearer, decrease the cost of the 
Eastern border and visa management as well as the potential influx of refugees. As it 
was the case, Poland demanded the Union to “advance the start of the new member 
states’ assessment with regard to their accession to Schengen” in order to enlarge it 
in 200735, i.e. right after introducing the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II). The Polish stance assumed “emphasizing [in the Hague programme 
– note by the Author] the principle of solidarity of the member states in the field of 
border protection, resulting in the Community financial support for the external border 
                                                                                                                                        
Criminal Code and some other acts. 
31 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams, JO L 162 of 20.6.2002, 
implemented within the Polish legislative framework by means of Article 2.2 of the Act of 16 April 2004 
introducing changes to Criminal Code and some other acts. 
32 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the fight against terrorism, JO L 164 of 22.6.2002, 
implemented within the Polish legislative framework by means of Article 2/2 of the Act of 16 April 2004 
introducing changes to Criminal Code and some other acts. 
33 Although the Treaty of Amsterdam integrated the Schengen acquis into the framework of the acquis 
communautaire, in fact, in accordance with the Commission’s decisions, some regulations (most of the 
Convention’s articles, including visa policy) were intended to come into force by the date of a new 
member’s accession, whereas some of them were only indispensable for a member state’s full 
participation in Schengen, with a view to removing all internal border checks (final assessment of 
border security and capability to introduce the Schengen Information System) - The European 
Commission press releases: Schengen and Enlargement (July 2001), List of provisions of the 
Schengen acguis (August 2001). 
34 Joerg Monar, op. cit. 
35 Statement of the Minister of Interior and Administration, Mr. Ryszard Kalisz - Press Office of the 
Ministry of Interior and Administration, 26.10.04. 
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management”, with an appropriate funding in the EU’s 2007-2013 budget36. 
 
What is striking in Poland’s position37 is a lack of any initiative intended to create 
common European legislation pertaining to internal security, especially no support for 
establishing EU’s internal security institutions or extending competence of the already 
existing bodies (like Europol). Evidently, a predominant view, and one that has been 
quite popular in Poland lately, is that the internal security should remain the 
prerogative of member states38. Instead, Poland suggested emphasizing “specific 
actions developing the area of freedom, security and justice.”39 
 
The Polish position also lacks any support for the Commission’s idea to establish or 
develop the Community’s JHA agencies. It fails to back the idea of extending 
competence of Europol40 and Eurojust and, moreover, it expresses a negative 
attitude towards the idea of establishing a European Corps of border guards41 or a 
European Asylum Office (EAO)42. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
If we compare the Polish stance to the final version of the Hague programme we 
might find the latter to be a formal success of the Ministry of Interior and 
                                            
36 “Poland’s stance on the Hague programme, concerning home affairs” – a document issued by the 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior and Administration on the Author’s request 5 November 2004. 
37 Ib. 
38 Unofficially, the opposition against establishing new common bodies or extending competence of 
the already existing ones results from reluctance to any bureaucratic initiatives, producing even more 
complex and probably ineffective administration structures, as was explained to the Author. 
39 The Author’s inquiries in the Ministry of Interior and Administration show that the Ministry’s officials 
understand these actions as, among other things, operational cooperation of the police, judicial or 
even intelligence services. 
40 It is worth reminding that Poland was among the last new member states that entered Europol (1 
November 2004) and, at the time of formulating its stance, it acted only as an associate member – 
through its own fault. Shortly after accession seven countries entered Europol: Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary and Cyprus. In November, only Poland, Malta and 
Estonia remained outside the organization, due to delays in document preparation and submission. 
41 “Poland’s stance on the Hague programme, concerning home affairs” – a document issued by the 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior and Administration on the Author’s request 5 November 2004. 
The Minister of Interior and Administration, Mr. Ryszard Kalisz, told the media that: “No common 
border guard need be established. The Polish border is to be guarded by the [National] Border Guard." 
- Press Office of the Ministry of Interior and Administration, 26.10.2004. 
42 “Poland’s stance on the Hague programme, concerning home affairs” – a document issued by the 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior and Administration on the Author’s request 5 November 2004. 
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Administration as well as the Ministry of Justice, particularly in terms of emphasizing 
the need to enlarge Schengen promptly and to start the appropriate candidate states’ 
assessment as soon as in the first half of 200643. Torpedoing the idea of establishing 
a European Corps of border guards might seem another success. However, the issue 
of financing the national border guards by means of the principle of solidarity fails to 
be a total success. In fact, the Hague programme does not mention specific ways of 
financing border guards. Instead, what it includes is only a general emphasizing of 
the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing between the member states, including 
financial burdens of border guard management44. Does the final version of the Hague 
agenda really meet all the Polish needs? 
 
Regardless of any doubts, whether Poland should remain skeptic towards developing 
European legislation with establishing European internal security and justice 
institutions as a consequence, a number of questions, concerning logic and practice, 
still need to be resolved. 
 
1. Firstly, as there is essential evidence, both in many EU’s documents on JHA and 
in practice as well, of putting emphasis on creating common European legislative 
frameworks in this matter45, would it not be advisable for the new member state, seen 
as a provider of criminal threat on the one side and as an importer of terrorist threat 
on the other, to be more active in supporting European integration in the matter or 
even suggest new solutions?  
 
2. Secondly, does the condition of the Polish police and special services really 
encourages their counterparts of other European states to a complete and direct 
operational cooperation46? Would it not be wise for Poland to be a strong supporter 
of establishing European bodies acting as agencies for organizing or even forcing the 
operational cooperation? 
 
                                            
43 “The Hague Programme. Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” - 
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 4/5 November 2004, 14292/04, Annex I, p. 17 
44 Ib. 
45 For instance, the European terrorism definition, combating money laundering, mutual recognition of 
arrest and evidence warrants, etc. 
46 For instance, in March 2004, the Polish intelligence service was refused participation in a council of 
the five leading Union’s intelligence services. Some Western European politicians found it an 
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3. Is it not Poland’s best interest, in the face of organized crime and contemporary 
terrorism, to extend the competence of Europol47 or Eurojust? 
 
4. Lastly, is it not too optimistic to assume that all member states will equally share 
the costs of protecting the Eastern border, relying on the Polish organizational and 
staff resources? 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
opportunity to make malicious comments. 
47 Particularly, Article 2 of the Europol Convention limits Europol’s competence to combating serious 
crimes affecting more than one Member State. Poland’s interest would be to extend this body’s 
jurisdiction also over cases involving only one Member State if crime originates outside the EU. In the 
current Polish situation, criminal threat may have its roots in the former Soviet Union’s territory, Iraq or 
Afghanistan. 
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The Center for International Relations (CIR) is an independent, non-governmental 
establishment dedicated to the study of Polish foreign policy as well as those international 
political issues, which are of crucial importance to Poland. The Center’s primary objective 
is to offer political counselling, to describe Poland’s current international situation, and to 
continuously monitor the government’s foreign policy moves. The CIR prepares reports and 
analyses, holds conferences and seminars, publishes books and articles, carries out 
research projects and supports working groups. Over the last few years, we have 
succeeded in attracting a number of experts, who today cooperate with the CIR on a 
regular basis. Also, we have built up a forum for foreign policy debate for politicians, MPs, 
civil servants, local government officials, journalists, academics, students and 
representatives of other NGOs. The CIR is strongly convinced that, given the foreign policy 
challenges Poland is facing today, it ought to support public debates on international 
issues in Poland.  
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